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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 990856-CA 
v. : 
DAVID L. HANSEN : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for theft of a motor vehicle, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 (1995) and 76-4-412 (Supp. 1995), 
in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Ray M. Harding, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVTEW 
1. Did defendant receive ineffective assistance from his trial counsel who failed to 
request a jury instruction on the statutory affirmative defenses to theft? A claim of 
ineffective assistance raised for the first time on appeal is reviewed for correctness. State 
v. Maestas, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 22, f 11,388 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (citing State v. Simmons, 
866 P.2d 614, 618 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
2. Did the trial court commit plain error in failing to sua sponte give the same 
jury instruction on the statutory affirmative defenses to theft referenced in Point I? 
This issue is reviewed under uie same standard referenced in Point I. Maestas, 2000 
UtahCt. App. at 5 11. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
The following rules and statutory provisions are attached at Addendum A: 
Rule 19, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, David L. Hansen, was charged with one count of theft of a motor 
vehicle, a second degree felony (R. 3). A jury found defendant guilty (R. 177). The 
trial court sentenced defendant on August 18, 1995, to an indeterminate term of one to 
fifteen years to be served concurrently with a sentence defendant was already serving 
for forgery (R. 183-184). The court also ordered defendant to pay $817 in restitution 
(R. 183-184). Defendant requested a restitution hearing and motioned for a stay of the 
time requirement for filing a notice of appeal until after the restitution hearing (R. 186, 
188). The trial court granted defendant's motion to stay the time for filing an appeal 
until thirty days following the restitution hearing (R. 190). A restitution hearing was 
held on October 18, 1995 (R. 193). Defendant filed a notice of appeal on November 
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17, 1995 (R. 199). 
This Court sua sponte dismissed defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction due 
to an untimely filing of notice of appeal (R. 214-215). * Defendant was resentenced on 
September 1, 1999, (R. 239; 252), and filed a timely notice of appeal on September 30, 
1999 (R. 242). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant borrowed Kevin Edwards' truck and Shar Pei dog on the evening of 
April 6, 1994, and went "up to the stripper's bar up in Salt Lake" (R. 249:57-58, 60, 
70-71). Edwards never saw his truck or dog, nor heard from defendant, again (R. 
249:58-60). 
The Job 
Defendant met Kevin Edwards in jail in early 1994 (R. 249:109). Kevin gave 
defendant his mother's home telephone number and told defendant to call if he ever 
needed a ride (R. 249:97-98). A day or so before April 6, 1994, defendant called 
Kevin's mother, Bethany Westwood, at her home at 139 North 500 East in Provo, Utah 
1
 In a memorandum decision, this Court held that under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(8)(d), "the sentencing process can be completed even if the restitution 
determination is deferred" (R. 214-215). Judgment was final in this case when 
defendant was sentenced on August 15, 1995, despite the pendency of a restitution 
hearing (R. 215). Thus, the trial court's extension of defendant's time to appeal until 
thirty days from the November 21, 1995, entry of an order modifying restitution, 
impermissibly extended defendant's time for filing a notice of appeal beyond the extra 
thirty days allowed by Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (R. 214-215). 
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(the east-side home) (R. 249:44). Kevin was living at another home owned by his 
mother at 355 South 600 West in Provo, Utah (the west-side home) (R. 249:54). 
Defendant did not have much money (R. 249:60). "His wife had left him or kicked 
him out of the house. He had no place to go" (R. 249:57). Defendant briefly told 
Bethany that he needed a job and "asked if he could go down to the house that [Kevin] 
livefd] in and help clean the yard" (R. 249:44). Defendant stayed with Kevin for a few 
days, and Kevin put him to work "clean[ing] up the basement and the back room of the 
home at 355 South 600 West" (R. 249:57-58). Defendant had very little money during 
the time he lived with Kevin, and Kevin was not aware of defendant having any other 
source of income (R. 249:57, 60). 
The Truck and the Dog 
In 1971, Kevin's father bought a new GMC pickup truck (R. 249:45, 55). 
When his father died, Kevin traded another car with his mother in exchange for the 
1971 GMC truck (R. 249:55). Accordingly, Kevin's name appeared in the "Owner 
Information Section" of the truck's title (R. 249:55; State's Exhibit 1, attached at 
Addendum B). In 1988, Kevin borrowed about $3,500 from his mother to make 
repairs to the truck (R. 249:45, 56, 65). The repairs consisted primarily of completely 
rebuilding the engine (R. 45-46, 56, 65). Bethany insisted that Kevin sign the title over 
to her as security for the loan (R. 249:48, 50-51, 56). Pursuant to her request, 
Bethany's name was added to the "New Owner's Section" of the title, and Kevin signed 
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his name in the "Owner's Transfer" section of the title on November 30, 1988 (R. 
249:50-51, 53, 56; State's Exhibit 1). A notary public witnessed Kevin's signature, 
signed the title, and date stamped the document on November 30, 1988 (R. 249:50, 53, 
113; State's Exhibit 1). 
Bethany had kept the title to die truck in a drawer in her home until she 
transferred ownership to Kevin (R. 249:48). When Kevin signed ownership back over 
to Bethany, he did not give her back the title document itself; "[a]bout that time [she] 
had back surgery, and [she] was very ill" (R. 249:48-49). For "probably a year" 
before the theft of the truck, Kevin had kept die title to the truck in die truck's glove 
compartment (R. 249:56-57). 
Kevin also owned a pedigreed Shar Pei dog worth at least $500, and his 
backyard was securely fenced to keep in the dog (R. 249:58-59, 61-62, 71, 85; State's 
Exhibit 2). The Shar Pei liked defendant (R. 249:61). 
The Theft 
During die evening of April 6, 1994, defendant and Kevin sat around drinking at 
the east-side home where Kevin lived and discussed going to a stripper bar in Salt Lake 
City (R. 249:58, 62-63, 69-70). As mey were getting ready to leave, Kevin's friend 
Charlie Peterson stopped by to invite Kevin to go to an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting 
(R. 249:58, 69-70). While Kevin was changing his shirt, defendant told Charlie about 
his marital problems and that "Kevin was going to let him stay there for a few days 
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until he could . . . get on his feet" (R. 249:69-70, 74-75). Kevin decided to go with 
Charlie to the meeting instead of with defendant to the stripper bar (R. 249:58, 63, 70). 
Defendant, however, still wanted to go to the stripper bar and asked Kevin if he could 
borrow Kevin's truck and take the dog with him (R. 249:58, 61, 70-71). Kevin was at 
first reluctant to let defendant take the dog, but he ultimately told defendant that he 
could take the truck and the dog saying, "But I want you back in a few hours" (R. 
249:58, 71-72). Defendant indicated that "he was going to be back later that evening" 
(R. 249:70-71). As Kevin and Charlie left to go to the Alcoholics Anonymous 
meeting, they observed defendant "putting the dog in the front seat of the truck" (R. 
249:60, 71). HAnd that was the last time [Kevin saw defendant] until all of this came 
about" (R. 249:58-60). When defendant did not return with the truck and the dog, 
Kevin called and informed his mother (R. 249:46, 60-61). Bethany then called the 
police and reported that both the car and the dog had been stolen (R. 249:46, 78-79, 
84-85). 
The Crash and Discovery 
After taking the truck, defendant stayed in Utah for about a week and a half (R. 
249:103). Although he later claimed Kevin had sold him the truck, defendant did not 
attempt to register it in Utah during that time (R. 249:99-100, 103, 113). Defendant 
then drove the truck to Montana (R. 249:102-103). He did not attempt to register the 
truck in Montana (R. 249:103). After two weeks in Montana, defendant crashed the 
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truck (R. 249:103). Defendant was taken to the hospital, and the truck was towed to a 
private wrecking yard (R. 249:103-104, 109). 
After getting out of the hospital, defendant "parted the truck out," selling the 
rebuilt 350 Chevy engine to Jerry Dawson (R. 249:89, 103). Jerry never inquired 
about defendant's ownership of the truck because he intended to buy just the engine and 
"[defendant] was selling it, so I just assumed [he owned it]" (R. 249:89-92). The 
owner of the wrecking yard did not want the truck on her yard (R. 249:91, 93). She 
told Jerry that the truck had to be moved from her premises (R. 249:90-91, 94). 
Consequently, Jerry and a friend, who wanted the rear end of the truck, hauled it to 
Jerry's friend's logging property a block and a half from the wrecking yard (R. 249:93-
94). 
Jerry was later contacted by Provo City detectives who asked if Jerry knew 
where the title to the truck was (R. 249:94-95). Jerry told them he did not, "but [he] 
said [he] still thought the cab was down there at the logging place. So . . . [he] went 
down there and opened the glove box, and all the paperwork was in the glove box" (R. 
249:95). 
Defendant was subsequently charged with second degree felony theft of a motor 
vehicle (R. 3). The Shar Pei dog was never recovered (R. 249:59, 115). 
The Defendant's Story 
Defendant testified in his own behalf at trial (R. 249:96). He acknowledged 
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staying with Kevin and did not contest that he took Kevin's truck to Montana with the 
intent to keep it (R. 249:99, 102-103, 113). Defendant admitted that he had no bill of 
sale for die truck, that his name was not on die title to die truck, and mat, in fact, mere 
was noming "on [die title] mat would indicate to [defendant] that mat vehicle [wa]s 
[his]" (R. 249:111-112). He maintained, however, that he paid Kevin $650 for the 
truck and believed mat ownership of the truck had been transferred to him (R. 249: 
99-100, 113). Shown me title to me truck at trial, defendant identified Kevin's 
signature in me "Owners Transfer" section, a notary's signature dated November 30, 
1988, and Bediany's name in me "New Owner's" section (R. 249:113). Even mough 
Bethany's name appeared in me "New Owner's" section of me tide, defendant saw no 
need to check widi her regarding sale of me truck (R. 249:113). Defendant claimed he 
assumed diat merely having Kevin's signature, along with the notary's signature and 
date stamp, on me tide was sufficient to transfer ownership to him (R. 249:104, 112-
113). 
Defendant denied taking die Shar Pei dog, asserting diat it was in Kevin's back 
yard when he (defendant) left widi me truck (R. 249:104,115). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Although the State concedes mat defense counsel was deficient in failing to 
request a statutory affirmative defense instruction, defendant has failed to show mat he 
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was prejudiced because evidence of his guilt was compelling. Defendant, apparently 
impecunious, took the victim's truck and valuable dog, later claiming that he had 
purchased the former. However, no bill of sale accompanied the alleged purchase and a 
valid title, later found in the truck, showed no sign of defendant's alleged interest in the 
truck. Further, defendant never attempted to contact the victim about either the truck or 
the missing dog. Finally, notwithstanding the absence of an honest-claim-of-right or 
honest-belief-to-control instruction, the jury could not have been deaf to defendant's 
repeated expression of his defense theories, or failed to consider them in light of the clear 
language of the elements instruction. 
POINT II 
The State concedes that the trial court committed obvious error in failing to 
submit an appropriate affirmative defense instruction. Defendant's trial counsel could 
not have had a strategic basis for failing to request an instruction on die theory of the 
defense, clearly raised by the evidence, and the affirmative defenses to theft are 
statutorily provided for and actually appear in close proximity in the Criminal Code to 
the statute providing for the offense of theft. However, as fully set out in Point I, 




DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
BECAUSE HE WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY TRIAL COUNSEL'S 
FAHAJRE TO REQUEST A JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE 
STATUTORY DEFENSES TO THEFT 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel's failure to request an instruction on the 
statutory affirmative defenses to theft constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Aplt. 
Br. at 11-14. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 
show both diat his counsel rendered a deficient performance and that but for the deficiency 
there was "a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694,104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984); see also State 
v. Bullock, 791 p.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989); State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465 
(Utah App. 1993). 
A. The State Concedes Defendant's Trial Counsel was Deficient 
In Failing to Request an Affirmative Defense Jury Instruction. 
Specifically, defendant claims that his trial counsel failed to request an instruction 
on the affirmative defenses provided for by Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 (1999), which 
states, in pertinent part: 
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service 
involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or exercise 
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control over the property or service as he did[.] 
The State concedes that defendant's trial counsel was deficient in failing to 
request a jury instruction encompassing these two statutory defenses. "To prevail on a 
claim of ineffective assistance, appellant must demonstrate '"that counsel's actions were 
not conscious trial strategy/" and 'that there was a "lack of any conceivable tactical 
basis for counsel's actions."'" State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 633 (Utah App. 
1997). See State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, 1 32, 984 P.2d 376 (finding counsel 
deficient for failing to request an eyewitness identification instruction when "[t]he 
record does not reveal any reasonable tactic that would ameliorate or explain that 
deficiency"). 
It is perfectly plain from defendant's testimony (R. 249:100-01, 104, 113, 116), 
and trial counsel's opening statement (R. 249:41-42) and closing argument (R. 249: 
130-31) that the theory of the defense was that defendant had an honest claim of right to 
the truck and believed he had a right to exercise control of the truck. Nodiing in the 
record satisfactorily explains trial counsel's failure to request an instruction that would 
have provided the jury with clear grounds for acquittal if it found the facts accordingly. 
Therefore, defendant has satisfied the first prong of Strickland. Nonetheless, 
defendant's claim of ineffective assistance fails. 
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B. Defendant has not Met his Burden under 
the Ineffective Assistance Prejudice Prong. 
"To establish the prejudice prong [of ineffective assistance of counsel], the 
defendant must show 'a reasonable probability exists that except for ineffective counsel, 
the result would have been different.'" State v. Munson, 972 P.2d 418, 422 (Utah 
1998) (quoting State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988)). "'"A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.""' State 
v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283, 293 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 
712, 719 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694)), aff'd 2000 UT 
10, 994 P.2d 1243. In determining whether an error was harmful, a court considers a 
number of factors, including "the overall strength of me State's case." State v. 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992); State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1011 (Utah 
App. 1994). "The more evidence supporting the verdict, the less likely there was 
harmful error." Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 240. 
In order to prove defendant guilty of theft of a motor vehicle, the prosecution 
was required to prove that defendant "obtainfed] or exercisefed] unauthorized control 
over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof." Utah Code Ann. 
§76-4-404(1999). The evidence of defendant's guilt is compelling. Defendant 
admitted that he took Kevin's truck to Montana with the intent to keep it (R. 249:102-
103, 113). The only contested issue was whether defendant acted in the honest belief 
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that he was owner of the truck when he took it. 
Defendant admitted that he had no bill of sale for the truck (R. 249:111-112). 
Also, assuming arguendo that defendant saw the truck's title before leaving Kevin's 
home the evening of April 6, 1994, defendant acknowledged that he knew his name did 
not appear on the title (R. 249:112). In fact, defendant testified that there was nothing 
"on [the title] that would indicate to [defendant] that that vehicle [wa]s [his]" (R. 
249:112). Defendant maintained, however, that "[Bethany's] signature was on it, 
[Kevin's] signature was on it, and it was notarized. I thought it was fine" (R. 
249:113). 
Defendant's purported reliance on these signatures is, by itself, sufficiently 
compelling evidence that he did not honestly believe himself to be the owner of the 
truck and to sustain his conviction. Kevin's signature on the tide appears in the 
"Owner's Transfer" section plainly dated November 30, 1988 (R. 249:50, 52-53, 113; 
State's Exhibit 1). The notary's signature also appears in the "Owners Transfer" 
section in witness of Kevin's signature and is also plainly date-stamped November 30, 
1988 (R. 249:50, 52-53, 113; State's Exhibit 1). Bethany's name appears directly 
below those signatures in the "New Owners" section of the title (R. 249:50-51, 113; 
State's Exhibit 1). Defendant was thirty-three years old when he allegedly purchased 
the truck (Defendant's Exhibit 5). He has a high school education and is able to read 
English well (R. 249:107). He can not reasonably be thought to have had an honest 
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belief that a notarized signature from November 8, 1988, could transfer ownership to 
him on the evening of April 6, 1994, especially when the name appearing in the "New 
Owners" section was Bethany Westwood's and not his own. 
Moreover, the clear weight of evidence suggests that defendant never saw the 
title from Kevin, but rather subsequently manufactured an inconsistent story about the 
alleged transfer of the title. Kevin testified that he kept the truck's title in the glove 
compartment of the truck for about a year prior to defendant taking the truck (R. 
249:57). Defense counsel unsuccessfully sought to elicit from Kevin that he had gone 
to his mother's east-side home with defendant to get the title to give to defendant (R. 
249:64). However, defendant himself testified that Kevin went into the bedroom of 
"his home" and came back with the title, never asserting that he went with Kevin to 
Bethany's east-side home (R. 249:101). After wrecking the truck and selling the 
engine, defendant abandoned the truck and did not take the title with him (R. 249:88-
91, 93-95). In fact, die title was eventually discovered in the glove compartment where 
Kevin testified it had been all along (R. 249:95). 
Further, the presence of the title in the glove compartment defendant does not 
suggest that defendant acted with the honest belief that he owned the truck. Defendant 
said that he remained in Utah for a week and a half before leaving for Montana, yet he 
did not attempt to register the truck during that time (R. 249:103). Defendant was then 
in Montana for two and a half weeks before wrecking the truck, yet he never attempted 
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to register the truck during that time either (R. 249:103). 
The taking and failure to return Kevin's dog also suggests defendant's intent to 
permanently deprive Kevin of his truck. Kevin testified that defendant also took 
Kevin's pure bred Shar Pei dog valued at $500 (R. 249:58-59).2 Although defendant 
claims to have legitimately purchased the truck, he never offered an explanation for his 
failure to return Kevin's dog, and there is no evidence that he ever tried to contact 
Kevin about the dog's disappearance (R. 249:60). 
Defendant's impecunious circumstances also strongly suggest a motive to steal 
the truck and a valuable dog. Kevin testified that defendant had been kicked out of his 
house and needed money (R. 249:57-58, 60). Defendant admitted that he had no car, 
that he had stayed at least one night at Kevin's home, and that he spent at least two 
weekdays doing nothing but sitting around drinking Kevin's booze (R. 249:97-99, 110-
111; Defense Exhibit 5 (showing April 6, 1994, was a Wednesday)). Bethany testified 
that defendant called saying he needed a job, (R. 249:44), and Charlie testified that 
defendant told him Kevin was letting defendant stay with him until "he could get a job 
or get on his feet" (R. 249:75). In sum, because the evidence of defendant's guilt was 
compelling, there was no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome even if 
2
 Police reports indicate that Bethany reported both the truck and dog missing 
(R. 249:84-86; Defense Exhibit 5). That defendant left with the dog is also 
corroborated by Charlie Peterson, who said that he saw defendant put the dog in the 
front seat of the truck before leaving Kevin's home (R. 249:71). 
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defendant's trial counsel had requested an affirmative defense instruction. 
Finally, notwithstanding the absence of an appropriate affirmative defense 
instruction, the jury could not have been deaf to defendant's honest-claim-of-right or 
honest-belief-to-control theories and that they provided grounds for acquittal if proven. 
The elements instruction for motor vehicle theft required the jury find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant, 
4. Obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of 
another, 
5. Witfi the purpose to deprive die owner diereof[.] 
(R. 119). 
Defense counsel told the jury in his opening statement that defendant would 
claim he purchased the truck legitimately, but was inexperienced in handling me paper 
trail connected with such a purchase (R. 249:41-42). In accord, defendant testified 
that: (1) he purchased the truck for $650 (R. 249:100); he was naive about the vehicle 
purchase requirements, never having purchased a vehicle privately (R. 249: 
100); (3) he diought all he needed was a signed tide (R. 249:101); (4) he believed he 
was me owner of the car because the tide of me truck appeared proper to him (R. 
249:104, 116); (4) based on his belief diat he was the owner of me truck, he did not 
feel any obligation to return it (R. 249:104, 106); and (5) he assumed he had good title 
in spite of Bemany's name being in me "New Owner's" section of die tide (R. 
249:113). Thereafter, defense counsel reiterated in closing argument that defendant 
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thought the title was legitimate, that such a title would appear valid to an inexperienced 
buyer, and that defendant intended to buy, not to steal the truck (R. 249: 130-33). 
Plainly, the jury heard defendant's theories and, considering the requirements of the 
elements instruction, rejected them. 
Given the compelling evidence that defendant neither took the truck lawfully nor 
acted with the honest belief diat he took the truck lawfully, defendant has not met his 
burden of showing that he was prejudiced by the lack of a jury instruction on die 
defenses to theft. 
POINT n 
THE TRIAL COURT'S OBVIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO SUA 
SPONTE INSTRUCT THE JURY ON AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
DID NOT RESULT IN MANIFEST INJUSTICE BECAUSE 
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S GUILT WAS COMPELLING 
Although he did not object at trial, defendant now asserts that the trial court 
committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury on the same [statutory] affirmative 
defenses to the offense of theft which his counsel deficiently failed to request. Aplt. 
Br. at 9. "[J]ury instructions to which a party failed to object at trial will not be 
reviewed absent a showing of manifest injustice." State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 
608 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah App. 1995); 
Utah R. of Crim. Proc. 19(c). "[I]n most circumstances, the term 'manifest injustice' 
is synonymous with the 'plain error' standard[.]" State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-
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122 (Utah 1989). In order to show plain error, defendant must show: "(i) an error 
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; (iii) the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant[.]" State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
A. The State does not Contest that Obvious Error 
Prongs of the Plain Error Test have been Met. 
For purposes of this appeal and in the unique circumstances of this case, the 
State does not contest that the obvious error prongs of the plain error test have been 
met. The failure to contest this issue should not, however, be construed as a 
concession that a trial court is generally under a duty to sua sponte instruct the jury on 
all defensive issues arguably raised by the evidence. See State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 
1052, 1058 (Utah 1985) (holding that where there was no proposed instruction, and 
where the defense dieory argued on appeal was not obvious to the trial court from the 
evidence, the trial court had no duty to sua sponte instruct the jury on the defense 
theory). "[C]ourts are not required to constantly survey or second-guess the 
nonobjecting party's best interests or trial strategy." State v. Labium, 925 P.2d 937, 
939 (Utah 1996) (only when "errors are particularly obvious or egregious and would 
serve no conceivable strategic purpose" that courts must act sua sponte to prevent "a 
manifest procedural or substantial injustice"). 
Moreover, this Court will find a trial court's instructions adequate if they "g[ive] 
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defendant the legal framework for his theory of the case." State v. Standiford, 769 P 2d 
254, 266 (Utah 1988). Instructions will be sufficient so long as they correctly state the 
law and "allow[] defendant to argue his theory of the case." State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232, 
233 (Utah 1985). See also State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d 643, 647 (Utah 1982) (the trial 
court need not give a proposed instruction "if the point is properly covered in the other 
instructions"). 
Arguably the trial court did not commit plain error because, as suggested above, 
see Aple. Br. at 15-16, the elements instruction necessarily required the jury to 
consider defendant's affirmative defense theory. The instruction required the jury to 
find defendant guilty only if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that, "with a purpose 
to deprive," he "obtained or exercised unauthorized control over [Kevin's truck]" (R. 
119). Given that the jury could satisfy this requirement only if it rejected defendant's 
honest-claim-of-right or honest-belief-in-control theories, which were plainly before the 
jury, the elements instruction necessarily embraced the affirmative defense theories set 
out in section 76-6-402(3). In conjunction with the elements instruction, other 
instructions would have assisted in informing the jury as to defendant's affirmative 
defense. Specifically, the jury was instructed that it was to consider all the evidence, 
determine its force, and reconcile conflicts to the extent reasonably possible to 
determine the ultimate truth (R. 108-09, 114), and that a verdict of guilt required proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 107). See State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah 
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App. 1998) (the appellate court "'review[s] jury instructions in their entirety to determine 
whether the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law'") 
(citation omitted). 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the State does not oppose defendant's assertion 
of obvious error. "A trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable to 
the facts of the case." State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1231 (Utah 1997) (citation 
omitted). It should have been obvious to the trial court from the evidence that 
defendant's only defensive theory was that he "[a]cted in the honest belief that he had 
the right to obtain or exercise control over the property . . . as he did[.]" Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-402(3)(b) (1995). Aple. Br. at 15-16. The trial court should also have 
seen that there was "no conceivable strategic purpose" for defense counsel to fail to 
request an instruction on the relevant statutory defense to theft. Labrum, 925 P.2d at 
939. Cf. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) ("The plain error rule exists 
to permit review of trial court rulings as a way of protecting a defendant from the harm 
that can be caused by less-than-perfect counsel."). Most importantly, the affirmative 
defenses to theft are provided for by statute, section 76-6-402(3), in the very same 
chapter as, and separated by only a few pages from, the statute providing for the crime 
itself, section 76-6-404. In these unique circumstances, the State concedes that the trial 
court plainly erred in failing to give the appropriate affirmative defense instruction 
provided for by section 76-6-402(3). Nonetheless, defendant was not prejudiced. 
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B. Defendant has not Met his Burden 
Under the Plain Error Prejudice Prong. 
To establish the prejudice prong of plain error, defendant must show that "absent 
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome[.]" Dunn, 850 
P.2d at 1208. "The prejudice test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims is 
equivalent to the harmfulness test applied in assessing plain error." State v. Parker, 
2000 UT 51, f 10, P.2d (still subject to revision or withdrawal before 
publication); State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 1992). In determining 
whether an error was harmful, a court considers a number of factors, including "the 
overall strength of the State's case." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 
1992); State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1011 (Utah App. 1994). "The more evidence 
supporting the verdict, the less likely there was harmful error." Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 
240. 
For the same reasons that his claim fails on the prejudice prong for plain error, 
defendant has not met his burden of showing diat he was prejudiced by trial counsel's 
deficient performance. Aple Br. at 11-16. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that 
defendant's conviction be affirmed. ^ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ day of July, 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 19. Instructions. 
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court 
reasonably directs, any party may file written request that the court instruct 
the jury on the law as set forth in the request. At the same time copies of such 
requests shall be furnished to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel 
of its proposed action upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy 
of its proposed instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such instructions 
may be given orally, or otherwise waive this requirement. 
(b) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court 
shall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part 
refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of 
the charge was given and what part was refused. 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission 
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating 
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection. 
Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to instruc-
tions in order to avoid a manifest injustice. 
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court 
refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the 
exclusive judges of all questions of fact. 
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has 
instructed the jury. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon 
time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court. 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
76-6-402. Pretumpttana and def erne*. 
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part: 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory expla-
nation of such possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence 
that the person in possession stole the property. 
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an interest in the 
property or service stolen if another person also has an interest that the 
actor is not entitled to infringe, provided an interest in property for 
purposes of this subsection shall not include a security interest for the 
repayment of a debt or obligation. 
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service 
involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or 
exercise control over the property or service as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property or service 
honestly believing that the owner, if present, would have consented. 
76-6-404. Theft — Element* 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
76-6-412. Theft — Clarification of offenses — Action for 
treble damages. 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be 
punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 
76-1-601, at the time of the theft; or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if: 
(i) the value of the property or services is or exceeds $1,000 but is 
less than $5,000; 
(ii) the actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, 
or any burglary with intent to commit theft; or 
(iii) in a case not amounting to a second-degree felony, the property 
taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, 
sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, poultry, or a fur-bearing animal 
raised for commercial purposes; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is or 
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less 
than $300. 
(2) Any person who violates Subsection 76-6-408(1) or Section 76-6-413, or 
commits theft of property described in Subsection 76-6-412(lXbXiii), is civilly 
liable for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the 
plaintiff, and for costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
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